Hungary’s change of government in April 2026 opened a historic opportunity to restore democracy after 16 years of Viktor Orbán and Fidesz rule. The new government has already introduced reforms, including ending the state of emergency and abolishing the Sovereignty Protection Office. However, reversing democratic backsliding requires more than legislative reforms: it demands lasting institutional independence and safeguards against political interference.

Over the years, the EU developed several tools to address rule of law violations, including

• the annual Rule of Law Report, introduced in 2020, monitors developments across all Member States and provides country-specific recommendations.
• the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, applicable since 2021, aims to protect the EU budget from risks arising from rule of law breaches. So far, it has been applied only to Hungary, leading to the suspension of certain EU funds in 2022.
• the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), introduced in February 2021, is a temporary EU funding instrument primarily supporting economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, with national recovery plans also including rule of law reforms (set to end in December 2026).

While these instruments can help address rule of law problems, their role in supporting democratic restoration is less clearly defined. Together, they provide an extensive but fragmented framework, making it difficult for countries seeking to restore the rule of law to identify a clear path forward.

Of these tools, the Rule of Law Report offers particular potential to bridge this gap. Unlike the temporary RRF, it is a permanent tool covering a wide range of rule of law issues. It also provides recommendations and regularly assesses progress in implementing them. But is it flexible and focused enough to guide rule of law restoration?

Drawing on Hungary’s experience, Liberties’ member the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU), identifies three ways the Rule of Law Report could evolve to better support democratic restoration.

1. Reassess priorities as democratic restoration progresses

As Hungary moves towards restoring the rule of law, priorities are shifting. Longstanding problems remain unresolved, including judicial case allocation, judicial and prosecutorial remuneration, high-level corruption and restrictions on civil society. However, reforms initiated by the new government also raise questions that previous recommendations did not anticipate.

Judicial governance illustrates this challenge. The Commission’s 2026 recommendations continued to focus on case allocation and remuneration. Meanwhile, Hungary’s Seventeenth Amendment to the Fundamental Law strengthened the judiciary’s role in appointing and removing the President of the Kúria (Supreme Court) and the President of the National Office for the Judiciary.

These developments bring new concerns to the fore: how should institutions shaped by previous political interference be reformed? What should happen to existing appointments and mandates? And how can reforms prevent political influence by the new parliamentary majority?

Such questions are central to restoring judicial independence but are not fully captured by the existing recommendations. The Rule of Law Report should therefore reassess priorities as circumstances evolve, keeping longstanding problems under scrutiny while identifying emerging risks that require more immediate attention.

2. Scrutinise new institutions, not just their results

Restoring the rule of law often requires creating new institutions to address longstanding failures. However, establishing new bodies does not automatically guarantee greater accountability or independence.

Hungary’s efforts to combat high-level corruption demonstrate this concern. The Commission has long called for a consistent record of investigations, prosecutions and final judgments in high-level corruption cases. Its 2026 Report found no progress on this recommendation, although it acknowledged recent positive developments that had not yet produced measurable results.

To address this issue, the new government laid the constitutional foundations for the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office (NVVH) through the Seventeenth Amendment, followed by detailed legislation in August 2026. The creation of the NVVH means the Commission should assess not only whether Hungary achieves better results in tackling high-level corruption, but also how the new Office is designed and exercises its powers. This includes examining the limits of its authority, safeguards for those affected by its decisions, and the role of courts and other external controls.

3. Evaluate whether reforms work in practice

Legislative change is an important first step, but adopting new rules does not necessarily resolve the problems they are intended to address.

Hungary’s media reforms provide a clear example. Previous EU Rule of Law Reports raised concerns about the independence of the media regulator and public service media. In June 2026, Hungary adopted a new Media Act introducing changes to the Media Council’s appointment procedures. These include an open application process for its President, representation of professional organisations on the nominating committee and greater transparency in parliamentary selection. The first selection process under the new rules began in late July 2026.

However, an open selection process does not automatically guarantee independence, particularly when the governing parties retain a two-thirds parliamentary majority and face few political constraints on appointments requiring a qualified majority. Much depends on who participates in the selection, how candidates are assessed and whether the new leadership can act independently of the governing majority.

The Commission was therefore right to classify the reforms as ‘some progress’ rather than considering the reform complete. The Rule of Law Report should look beyond the adoption of legislation and assess whether reforms work in practice and effectively address the problems they were intended to solve.

These are some of the ways the Rule of Law Report could evolve to better support rule of law restoration. The Report could also establish clearer links with other relevant EU instruments and procedures, including RRF milestones, the conditionality mechanism and judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU.

Further resources

The EU rule of law report: a tool that records rather than prevents?

Rule of Law Gap Analysis 2026