In 2010, a man identified as M. provided a journalist with materials on the wrongdoings allegedly taking place at M.'s work. Apart from his phone number, the informant did not disclose any of his personal information to the reporter.

The journalist decided to contact the spokesperson of the company in which M. was employed, in order to verify the obtained information. As soon as he learned about this, M. stopped feeding the reporter with information and refused to consent to the publication of the previously provided materials.

Shortly afterwards, the journalist found out that a letter with questions about the alleged irregularities had been sent to the board of the company. He did not write the letter but the document was signed in his name.

The journalist felt deceived and decided to reveal to the employer the phone number reportedly used by the informant to make contact. He also forwarded an email received from M. Based on this obvious lead, M.’s identity was exposed, which led to his dismissal.

No explicit stipulation of anonymity

The reporter’s privilege provides legal protection to reporters from being compelled to testify about confidential information or sources. It was designed as a measure to protect the relationship between a journalist and their sources of information because this relationship must be based on trust.

In this case, the first instance court dismissed the informant’s claims, invoking the claimant’s failure to explicitly require the reporter to maintain his anonymity as a source.

The court also held that M. had acted in bad faith and referred to the journalist’s allegations of the informant having misrepresented him as the author of the letter.

This, according to the court, entitled the journalist to “disclose any information related to the case in order to explain the situation.”

Clear abuse of reporter’s privilege

The appeals court rejected the reasoning of the first instance court and ruled that the journalist’s disclosure of M.’s phone number and the email to the employer had been a clear abuse of the reporter’s privilege.

Since the informant had chosen not to reveal his name, argued the second instance court, it is difficult to contend that he had not required remaining anonymous since the intent to stipulate one’s anonymity can be expressed implicitly.

The appellate court also concluded that the fact that somebody posed as the journalist in the letter to M.’s employer was no justification for a breach of the reporter’s privilege.

The court emphasized that journalists are not only entitled, but also obliged to protect the identity of their informants.